amerikanbeat

The flaw in “racial profiling” for terrorists

February 24, 2010 · 2 Comments

Watching old footage of Ann Coulter turned up an argument heard in this country many times since 9/11. Coulter begins by citing patterns in the terrorist demographic. She lists bombing attacks in which Americans have died, concluding, “The perpetrators have all had the same eye color, hair color, skin color and half of them have been named Muhammad…This is not racial profiling; it’s a description of the suspect.”

Of course, she is being characteristically cheeky. She advocates “racial profiling” by name on the basis of this demonstrated pattern. In short, a terrorist is more likely to come from x-racial-group than from y or z groups; therefore, we are warranted in searching for terrorists among that group particularly. This might include singling out men fitting this description for random baggage or ID checks in subways, or funneling them through a separate check-in line at airports.

For the sake of argument, let us assume that Coulter’s data on terrorists is correct (though it isn’t); it is the form of the argument that is most suspect. It gives too much weight to the (statistical) relationship of racial groups to one another—that is, to the relative percentages of terrorists within each group. If we’re thinking properly, what should matter instead is the relationship of terrorists to their own racial groups.

The important point is not what percentage of terrorists are ‘middle eastern males with funny sounding names,’ versus males of some other group—but rather, what percentage of ‘middle eastern males with funny sounding names’ are actually terrorists.

Analogy #1: For all I know, men named George are .000003% more likely to be serial killers than men with other names. This would this hardly mean that shaking down a bunch of Georges would be a wise deployment of police resources. Shit, even if 100% of serial killers were named George, those Georges who actually commit serial murder are such a tiny minority among men named George that the strategy would still be suspect.

Analogy #2: Imagine we have a haystack which has some probability of containing a needle. (That is, there is some probability that one of the straws is a needle.) Let this probability match that of a given, random Arabic man’s being a terrorist; drawing a random straw is as likely to yield a needle as “drawing” a random Arabic man is likely to yield a terrorist. Let us assume this method of finding needles is ineffective, counterproductive, even immoral; also, that we have some far better method of finding needles in haystacks—using magnets, X-ray, floating the straw on water so the needle sinks, etc. We still want to root out needles, but have long abandoned the strategy of drawing random straws.

Now, imagine we discover that all along there has been a second haystack nearby which has an even lower probability of yielding a needle than our haystack. Perhaps we discover several more, each with some probability lower than the original, but still more than zero. It has become clear that a needle is more likely to come from the first haystack than from any of the others. Still, it would be irrational in the highest to conclude that we should, on this basis, resume our random straw draws. The simple fact that a less promising haystack exists does not magically make checking this stack a good idea, if it wasn’t a good idea before.

Similarly, the simple fact that terrorists are more likely to come from middle eastern men than from some other group doesn’t mean that the likelihood of randomly finding them among middle eastern men is very good at all.

Conclusion

The obvious question is just how good that likelihood is. I haven’t exactly crunched the numbers; you can do the math if you like. But there are millions of men in the world who fit Coulter’s “profile” and very nearly zero of these commit terrorist acts against Americans. Even fewer do so in those stereotypical ways that profiling would address. Even fewer operate in the U.S., where ours laws can actually penetrate. Clearly, we are dealing with numbers akin to those Georges who commit serial killing. It is quite likely that if we incarcerated every other Muslim male in the world, it would register nothing in practical terms to diminish the odds of the next terror attack. Yes, we can theoretically halve a .000003% chance of something. Getting married later in life will halve one’s chances of committing suicide someday. Buying a second ticket will double one’s chances of winning the lottery. There is shit you could do right now to halve your chances of being brainwashed by a cult or eaten by a mountain lion. Who gives a shit? Differences of this infinitesimal grade should no more drive policy than they drive anybody’s consideration of anything else in the real world.

This is not to mention that radical Islamists come in all “colors” and (duh) will easily work around any profile we make. Plus, racial profiling is counterproductive; it alienates those communities which are most critical for intelligence on the potential attackers that move and live among and gain cover from them. “Profiled” individuals tend to avoid law enforcement as much as possible.

Finally, as with finding needles in haystacks, we have a much better alternative strategy for fighting terrorism. Granted, jihadists will cite a number of gripes against the US if you ask them. Some of these concern cultural factors like our women’s liberation and sexy music and movies. But according to the evidence, these aren’t the “root” reasons they turn to terror. As I’ve argued elsewhere (link below), the violence is a response to US foreign policy in and toward Muslim countries and populations. Thankfully, these concerns are quite reasonable, technically solvable, and are morally “overdetermined”—that is, they should be met for a host of reasons even aside from fighting terror.

[See the last boldface section of the post here.]

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On workplace incentives: The ethics of getting extra for what we are already supposed to be doing

February 11, 2010 · Leave a Comment

[Dedicated to E. N.]

I work at a bank. I’m not a teller but my job description includes running a cash till. There are incentives for balancing—making sure we don’t give away or take in too much money through miscount. After threats from management to do away with these incentives, they finally have. Budgetary reasons aside, the idea is that it is one’s job to balance, and it makes no sense to “reward a person for doing what he is supposed to be doing already.”

This post explores this argument in the interest of workers’ intellectual self-defense.

Hyperbolic indignation

The bankers’ argument should seem odd on its face, for we constantly violate it in practice. In every other avenue of life there is space for praising (i.e., rewarding) people for doing what they should already be doing. “Giving recognition” to those who simply meet the dictates of their roles is widely considered a virtue. What a monstrous spouse, for instance, who never thanked or praised the other for doing their “duty” as husband or wife. The same goes for parents of children, teachers of pupils, close friends, etc. On consideration, I suspect the vast majority of what we praise and reward falls solidly within the region of what one is “supposed to do” already.

The ‘extreme’ cases show the point most clearly. Consider heroes: Most would agree that the lifeguard who dives in to save the drowning child, or the returning soldier who has braved bullets in defense of country, are due some special recognition—paycheck aside. At least, nobody finds it odd or illegitimate to give it. (Indeed, “hero” is a normative term; to apply it to such persons is already to confer special recognition.) Nonetheless, every hero, when interviewed, humbly defends that he only did “what anyone would have done in my position” or no more than “what I had to do.” And he is entirely correct: Despite our high praise, we can agree that, given his circumstances, he had to try and save that child (etc.). He was “supposed to do” it. Indeed, if he had twiddled his thumbs while the child flailed about, or the bullets flew, he would not only be a non-hero like the rest of us, but a sonuvabitch deserving everything from harsh criticism to legal persecution.

Finally, it occurs to me that on a daily basis I recognize my dog for performing such acts as coming to me when I call her; perhaps I even give her a biscuit. She is then a “good dog.” But coming when I call isn’t really “good”; it’s just un-bad. That is, a dog who comes when called is just behaving as a companion animal should; it doesn’t exceed the mandates of what she is “supposed to do.” And yet, each of us understands the praise attending this behavior. It is just what a proper “owner” (yuck) does.

It would appear, then, that the scope of “rewardable” behavior overlaps with the scope what one is “supposed to do.” Some of the latter are also the former. They are not entirely separate dimensions, as the bankers’ argument would have it. At least, nobody really thinks they are. To quote Charles Peirce, “let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy [i.e., when constructing arguments] what we do not doubt in our hearts.”

“Supposed to” versus “have to” or “is expected to”

The question remains: Why do we reward “supposed to” behavior? We do it, but can we justify it?

First, while virtually everyone supports rewarding heroic behaviors, it is actually easier to justify rewards like balancing incentives. This, because unlike a lifeguard’s rescuing the drowning child, a teller doesn’t have to balance. Being out of balance (within reason) is not a fireable offense; almost every teller is out from time to time. (If she weren’t, nobody would ever think to reward her for it.) So every time a teller balances, while she may be doing what she is “supposed to do,” she is nonetheless doing more than she must do.

From another angle: Yes, one is “supposed to” meet one’s job description. But any job description is the articulation of an ideal. As “ideal” would suggest, nobody lives up to it, nor does anyone think they will. This being the case, “supposed to” is a rather hollow basis for an incentive scheme. What one is “supposed to do” is always more than what we expect them to; one ought to balance all the time, but he is not expected to.

In short, we are well within our rights to reward those who exceed expectations, who do more than they have to do. Whether this falls within what they are “supposed to do” is beside the point.

“Bonus” is just a figure of speech

An incentive is presented as a “bonus,” something added to a predetermined wage-base. But let us not make too much of mere words. We can just as accurately describe it as a penalty for not balancing. Instead of a chance to pad my check, maybe I’m just fighting not to lose the last part of it. We have as much reason to look at it that way as the way our employer presents.

At best, then, a balancing incentive is ambiguous; depending on how you look at it, it could be a bonus, or it could be a penalty. Is there anything which might favor one interpretation over the other? I can think of two lines of argument:

i.

The legal convention of contra proferentem (“against the one bringing forth”) says that, when a dispute hangs on ambiguities in the wording of a contract, it goes against the party who drafted the document. This is designed to prevent the deliberate use of language which can be “bent” one way to entice a second party and then “bent” the other way to win a dispute. Law aside, the principle behind this is a good one, with broad application. The party perpetrating an ambiguity—and any dispute stemming from it—should be the very last to benefit from it. The party upon whom the ambiguity was “passively” foisted gets the benefit of any doubt.

In short, when faced with the “bonus vs. penalty” ambiguity, our prejudice should go against the party who set the whole scheme up. In this case, it is clearly the employer.

ii.

More important, whenever other kinds of employer “contributions” to wages have been studied, they have been shown to be factored as part of wages themselves.

The clearest example is payroll taxes. A percentage of each worker’s paycheck (15.3%) is owed in payroll tax. In theory, the worker pays half of this, and the employer pays the other half. But this is a “difference that makes no difference.” The employer is responsible for sending 15.3% of each wage to the government—period; it makes no difference that half this amount appears in writing on the paycheck stub.

The question is only whether the payroll tax is ultimately carved out of employer profits, or worker wages. The answer is not controversial; virtually all tax economists, across the political spectrum, agree: The payroll match is anticipated in the decision to hire any new worker, and the wage adjusted downward accordingly. An employer will not hire an additional worker unless the costs associated with taking her on—wages-proper, inputs, additional wear and tear on machinery, etc.—is less than the value of what she will produce. The payroll match has become a “cost of production” like any other, and is accounted as such. And why wouldn’t it be? Let us make not a fetish of bookkeeping; in real effect, the entire tax is deducted from wages.[1] There is no reason to think that balancing incentives work any differently.

Conclusion

The bankers’ argument presumes that the only legitimate reason to give “extra” is when people are “owed” it. This “economic thinking” is encouraged by capitalism. In real life, we reward people for all kinds of reasons—we want to influence behavior; make a statement; keep people around; avoid the consequences of not rewarding; or just to be nice. (Even the bankers’ argument is too narrow. It overlooks the loss-preventive function of balancing incentives: One hesitates to pilfer a twenty from the till if that move will cost her a few hundred come the end of the quarter.)

The idea that we can’t reward work one is “supposed to do” is so contrary to how we behave that it must be ideological—that is, a reflection of the stories capitalism has to tell to live with itself. Namely, the whole system is said to rest on the free and fair exchange of “value-equivalents.” All “factors” of production “deserve” (are bought/sold at) a price in proportion to what they contribute to production. Labor is just another factor; so anything it earns above its price—like a bonus—represents an injustice toward the employer.

A bit of (oversimplified) Marxist theory tells us this story is false. When “free and equal” exchange is generalized, each capitalist just breaks even. Buying at cost and selling at cost gets him nowhere. Nor can this be circumvented by selling at a markup; marking up iron spoons by 10% just “washes” with the 10% markup which the previous capitalist placed on the iron ore sold to make the spoons. The key to profit is to find a “factor” which, like magic, produces value in excess of its own value. Labor alone fits this bill; the quantity of goods it takes to sustain itself (in a given period) is less than what it can produce during that time.[2]

Not only, then, is everything which capitalists call a “bonus” not one; but under the current system, the very idea of a bonus is impossible. Capitalists cannot add anything to the “value” of labor because they don’t pay its “value” in the first place—if they wish to remain capitalists for long.[3] No incentive package will raise a worker’s takings to her real worth. There is no such thing as an “illegitimate” reward, right up to the point that the entire operation is transferred in share to the workers.

Notes

[1] Example taken from Paul Krugman, Fuzzy Math: The Essential Guide to the Bush Tax Plan, pp. 42-43.

[2] The Marxist theory of exploitation and the labor theory of value is given in more detail here (Sect. 1 mostly): http://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/lg67/intromet/index.htm

[3] By “value” in this sentence I mean value in explicit neoclassical capitalist terms—the value of what labor produces for the capitalist; in truth, the value of labor is whatever the value of the goods it takes to keep the worker alive, which, again, is less than this quantity.

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*bump* Socialism and altruism (or, the “human nature” argument against socialism)

January 21, 2010 · Leave a Comment

http://amerikanbeat.net/2008/01/30/socialism-and-altruism/

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Assessing the “Historical Ties” Argument for Zionism

December 20, 2009 · Leave a Comment

[A recent conversation prompted me to get clear on the issues below. As in the past, my treatment owes much to Michael Neumann's excellent “The Case Against Israel.” I'll say it again: If you read only one book on the Palestine-Israeli conflict, make it this one.]

Defenders of Zionism—here, the idea that Jewish people are entitled to Israel—almost always begin from the assertion that “the Jews” inhabited the area in question some very, very long time ago.

In fairness, this is not the entirety of the Zionist argument; still, the point is always made to bear more weight than it should. For example: If Jews lived in the region long-ago, well, so did Arabs and a lot of other groups; some of these predate the Israeli settlement. Indeed, there is probably no spot of inhabited earth to which somebody else did not have title at some distant point; this poses no pressing moral issue for any of us (including the Zionists)—So why should it be so central to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

The most we can cede the Zionists is that certain Jews had some claim to certain parts of what is now Israel—some very long time ago. What we cannot say is which particular Jews had claims to which parts, and whether these persons are the direct ancestors of the Jews pressing contemporary claims, and whether those claims are to those actual parts. Yet this is precisely what we need if the “claims” in question are to fit the normal mold of modern proprietary justice.

Worse, even if we could establish with certainly that this ancestor had legal title to this parcel of land, and this modern person is his direct descendant—that wouldn’t be enough. First, property claims can be given up—sold, exchanged, abandoned. Sometimes they are gotten by coercive or fraudulent means and thus were never legitimate in the first place. Without knowing the whole history of exchanges in which a given parcel is embedded, we have no way to know whether a given later claim is just.

Second, as Neumann warns, “descendant” should never be conflated with “rightful inheritor.” Since when does property automatically fall to the biological offspring of-the holder? This isn’t the way we adjudicate property claims in the modern world. (Nor is it the way the Zionists set up the laws in the new government they formed.) If we are going to assess Zionist claims according to ancient rather than contemporary norms of inheritance—that is, if we are going to abandon that “modern propriety justice’” that holds in every other case—will we go the whole hog, and let Jewish property only pass to the male descendants, by way of each eldest son? That would warrant a radical redistribution of Israeli holdings, to say the least. (And what of other norms, unrelated to land? Will we permit contemporary Israelis to re-enslave the descendants of the Canaanites their ancestors overcame? This kind of reckoning gets ugly fast.)

***

Perhaps we might endorse nationalist land claims on the basis of group—“peoples”—rather than individuals: “The Jews” lived in what is now Israel; therefore, “the Jews” are entitled to it today.

One problem: The Israelites, by their own account, came to the land in question as invaders and conquerors. Do a thief’s descendants have a right to inherit items he stole? Typically, one is not entitled to stolen property even if the theft is many times removed from the transaction by which she came by it.

It may be said that after so many generations, we can let sleeping dogs lie. But the issue is more complicated. The Hebrews were just one in a long string of conquerors—the Canaanites before them, the Assyrians, Persians, Greeks (etc.) after. What warrant is there for plucking one “people” from the middle of this long chain, and saying, these, but none ofthe others, have the legitimate claim. Nor is there anything about the character of the Israeli tenure that might bolster that claim among the rest; it is distinguished only my its tenuousness, brevity, and the smallness of its geographic footprint.

The Jewish case is typical: In the ancient world, large displacements of people—“peoples,” no less—were typically full of violence and theft, and the history of world leading up to the present distribution of people is chock full of such large displacements. This makes it unlikely that anybody, anywhere has a just claim to the spot of land they occupy.

It also makes it impossible to figure out who should rightfully own any spot. Imagine a bicycle which has for eons been alternately stolen, sold, traded, lent, abandoned, split into parts which have been alternately stolen, sold, traded, lent, etc.; imagine that some of the “thefts” were legal according to the laws of the day or were made so retroactively—and that some of the bequeathments which were legal, customary or moral at the time would not be so under our own laws and norms.

A “long-ago” claim to land is like a claim to this bicycle: First, there is no obvious, non-arbitrary principle of justice according to which these competing “less-than-just” claims could be sorted out. Second, there is a practical problem: Even if we had the principle, the empirical history of who took what from whom, when, is lost to us. We simply have no data to apply a principle to.

This is why virtually zero of the potential claimants to long-ago land press these claims, and why nobody would pay any attention if they did. (The Italians are not going to ask for the lands of the old Roman Empire, nor would even the most liberal among us demand all of the U.S. for the Native Americans.) The Zionists have a colossal burden of proof in showing what is special about their claim, or what is dead wrong about all of those that don’t get pursued—that is, what is dead wrong about the prevailing norm that those claims oughtn’t be pursued. (A norm, mind you, that they would support in every other case.)

One caveat: It is tempting to conclude that, if present land claims are all irremediably unjust, then “anything goes” in the way of re-distribution. (What’s wrong with stealing from a thief?) But this doesn’t follow. It doesn’t even follow that every legitimate claim—if we could figure those out—should be honored. As Neumann notes, even if the current inhabitants of the U.S. do not have a just claim to America, to force them from this land and “redistribute” it to the Native Americans (or to anyone else) would itself constitute a new and prohibitively grave injustice—or, if you like, would require new and prohibitively grave injustices in the course of enforcement. (Note that this is abundantly not the case in, say, returning the Occupied Territories and the post-1967 settlements to the Palestinians.)

The principle that makes this so is the same one behind the legal device of construction easements: Occasionally, a homeowner finds that the edge of her house rests on a neighbor’s property. In this event, it is almost never the case that the house must be destroyed or rebuilt; the property line is simply adjusted. The neighbor has a claim to that strip of land, but pursuing that claim would cause such hardship to an innocent party—the first homeowner—that he is not legally allowed to act upon it.

The easement example suggests a final point. Let’s assume that the Zionist claim to Palestine is legitimate, and that it is absolutely moral to pursue it. This still does not mean it should be pursued in just any old willy-nilly fashion. Implementing a claim requires both a just process and a proper authority to do the implementing.

By analogy: I work at a bank; a parent once came in with a check made out to her adult child who was away at college; the parent wanted to cash the check for herself. When this was denied, she pressed the point that she was paying for her child’s schooling and upkeep, and he owed her the money; she even offered to show receipts for some dorm furniture she’d bought. Of course, this was all worthless to the case. Even if she’d had a contract ordering her son to repay her for tuition on that date, it wouldn’t have worked. The point is not that she didn’t have a real claim to the money—she did. The point is that I wasn’t allowed to adjudicate her claim. I couldn’t just dip into his bank account and hand it to her. Nor could I, nor say, her local butcher or a random bystander, kick her kid’s teeth in, take his bike and sell it to get his mom the money. Enforcement of the claim is a job for the court system—and you can bet they can’t go about it in any way they please, either.

So even if “the Jews” had a right to move into Israel, it does not follow that David ben-Gurion had a right to form an army and unilaterally force the Arabs out, on his specific timetable, without compensation, warning, or arrangements made to facilitate the move.

* * *

In conclusion, there is an ironic sense in which none of the above really matters. For Zionism was never about “living in” the land but rather about ruling over it. The P/I “conflict” would be much simpler if the issue were just habitation. Indeed, the conflict was much simpler—or rather, nonexistent—until it became clear to the Arab population that their new Jewish neighbors were not content to continue living peacefully by their side, but rather intended to exercise sovereignty over them.

This is the heart of the issue: Even if we knew what we do not—that the Israelis had a claim to Israel, and the right to pursue that claim—and how to do this in a moral way and by whose authority—none of that would license anything like the racial-apartheid occupation state we know.

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Bill O’Reilly, Law & Order, and Right Wing Immigration Policy in Moderate’s Clothing

December 20, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Bill O’Reilly was recently offended by some dialogue appearing on the Dec. 9 episode of Law & order: SVU. John Larroquette, guesting as an immigrant-rights advocate, says:

“…Limbaugh, Beck, O’Reilly, all of them. They’re like a cancer spreading ignorance and hate. I mean, they have convinced folks that immigrants are the problem, not corporations that fail to pay a living wage or a broken health care system.”

More on his comments below, but of course O’Reilly denied that he has done any such thing. His ire at the ”defamatory and outrageous” comments was entirely directed at the show’s producer, Dick Wolf, whom he labeled “a liar” and a “coward” and “a despicable human being for distorting and exploiting this very complicated situation.”

Bill O’Reilly: Dry snitchin’ motherfucker

A Weird Conflation

Putting the content of the Larroquette’s statement aside, the really weird thing about O’Reilly’s response is his readiness to equate a fictional character’s position with that of the show’s producer. (Note that by show business rules, Wolf’s “producing” the show need mean nothing more than that he owns it. It doesn’t mean he wrote it or even reviewed the script.) There isn’t any warrant for this. For one, its impossible to make this equation consistently, as different characters on the show adopt different, mutually incompatible positions; they can’t all be speaking for Wolf.

Indeed, Larroquette’s own comments are met with instant disapproval by another character, Det. Tutuola (played by Ice-T), who snaps at him to ”Save the soap box… the cameras are not even running.” Plus, Tutuola is a major, reoccuring character—a sympathetic hero, arguably—versus Larroquette’s one-off. If L&A is a vehicle for Wolf’s views, this function would almost certainly be exercised through the regular lineup.

If his characters are simply mouthing the producer’s own views, Wolf is guilty of far more than mis-paraphrasing a talk show host. For there is probably no vile nor illegal position that has not been voiced on the L&A franchise in the last two decades, as it is a fucking cop show profiling miscreants and wrongdoers of all stripes. Let us neither forget O’Reilly himself has penned a book full of characters more unsavory than savory, including a serial killer. Should we take his depictions of murder and corporate skullduggery in “Those Who Trespass” to mean he advocates these things? And if not, why assume it of Wolf?

Finally, there is nothing in Wolf’s depiction of Larroquette’s character than cannot be explained in terms of simple realism. Fairly or not, the view that O’Reilly “spreads ignorance and hate’” toward the immigrant community is both “out there” and moreover very widespread among immigration-rights activists such as Larroquette portrays. If this view is a misunderstanding, even a ”lie,” be assured it is one shared across the demographic. Surely O’Reilly does not suggest that fiction be populated only by good characters with sound views.

Unpacking O’Reilly’s Defense

O’Reilly’s main defense is that he has always distinguished between the actions of the immigrants themselves and those of the federal government who makes immigration policy, condemning the latter but not the former: “I have consistently defended poor people who only want a better life. If you watch ‘The Factor’ you know my beef is with the federal government not controlling illegal immigration and with violent aliens who wreak havoc once they get here.” O’Reilly illustrated the point with a montage of clips, including those where he declares he would immigrate illegally to the U.S. if he were a “poor Mexican.”

For the record, I have no reason to doubt that O’Reilly has sympathetic feelings toward illegal immigrants in general. What is less clear is how this actually addresses Larroquette’s comments. For it is certainly possible to ”spread ignorance and hate” without being oneself being ignorant and hateful.

Consider an analogy: A common criticism of Affirmative Action from the right is that it breeds resentment—and “hate”—toward its minority and female beneficiaries in the white men who feel unfairly disadvantaged by it. Whether or not you think this is true (I don’t, nor would I care if it were), it is clear that those who make this criticism are not alleging that supporters of AA ”hate” the people of color whom they intend to benefit from it. (Much the opposite, I’m sure.) If AA breeds ”hate” of blacks, it isn’t because its proponents hate blacks. Rather, it is an inadvertent, unintentional effect which operates despite the personal feelings of its proponents.

To repeat, the point is not that right-wing critics of AA are correct, but to illustrate the distinction between the feelings and intentions behind a statement or a position, and the effects of that statement.

* * *

So far, this only shows that O’Reilly’s defense has no teeth. It doesn’t show that some other defense wouldn’t work. That is, it doesn’t show that he is actually guilty of spreading ignorance and hate”—only that his feeling kind toward immigrants doesn’t make it impossible that he could be.

So is O’Reilly responsible for hatred toward immigrants? I’m sure he is—at least, his views are. However, I’m not going to take the space to argue that here. But I want to suggest a way this could work, which doesn’t depend on him having negative feelings toward this group:

Consider O’Reilly’s point that he doesn’t blame immigrants, but rather the U.S. government for not doing enough to block them. First, from a moral standpoint, this is a bogus distinction. It is like saying we don’t have a problem with people owning pets, only with the government for failing to outlaw pet ownership. Clearly, the criticism of the government here implies that the immigrants are doing something wrong. To the extent that O’Reilly says they aren’t, he simply sends a mixed message; the opposite message doesn’t cease to be sent.

It’s a very short step from recognizing that immigrants are wrong for immigrating, to blaming them for all the negative effects of illegal immigration which O’Reilly harps upon night after night. And if I can blame them for “taking my job,” or “raising my taxes,” etc., I can certainly resent, possibly even “hate,” them for this as well.

Whether this progression from O’Reilly’s criticism of the government to “hate” actually takes place is an empirical psycho-sociological point I can’t begin to prove here. The point is that O’Reilly’s personal “feelings” toward immigrants gives us no reason to think it couldn’t.

O’Reillian Moderation is a Mile Wide and an Inch Deep

O’Reilly is fond of saying he’s not a member of the right, even going so far as to claim he’s “not a political guy” at all. Part of why I write this is to show the kind of technique he uses to ‘get away with’ this kind of claim. O’Reilly’s overt sympathies toward poor illegal immigrants seem very un-conservative, and maybe in themselves they are. But they don’t do any real work within his arguments; they don’t mitigate his very conservative conclusions about what immigrants actually do. They coexist with arguments that, I have tried to show, probably “spread…hate” toward this group, or certainly lend themselves to this outcome for anyone willing to follow it through to consistency. In this sense his “nice feelings” are merely trappings, an afterthought serving to soften the swallow.

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North Korea shifty on nukes? Don’t believe the hype

May 29, 2009 · 1 Comment

[An old piece from '07 to provide some historical context for NK's current "sabre rattling." I'd like to update this sometime.]

The latest reporting on North Korean arms talks repeats the idea that recent successes represent a kind of tentative “breakthrough” with a recalcitrant negotiator, all the more so due to the “shiftiness” of this opponent. For example, CNN: “Few people believe that North Korea will fulfill all of its promises. After all, Pyongyang has sidestepped previous agreements.”This is quite far from the truth. Not only would a reasonable agreement have been struck long ago had the US negotiated for such in earnest, but North Korea (NK) has proved quite true to its word, and indeed in the face of consistent US diffidence and aggression.

I wrote the following timeline awhile ago to demonstrate the US role in the failure of US-NK relations and in the (alleged) nuclear rearmament by NK. I wanted to debunk the claim that NK “broke a promise” to halt nuclear armament and that as a result, future negotiations over nuclear arms would be pointless, as they could produce at best highly unreliable agreements.

Recall that the “Agreed Framework” (AF) of 1994 brokered by Clinton basically called for cessation of the NK nuclear programme—along with its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and admission of IAEA nuclear facility inspectors. In return, the US would build two non-weaponizable light-water nuclear reactors to provide energy for NK and would supply heating oil (500,000 tons per year on a scheduled dispensation) until their completion. Perhaps most importantly, the AF called for both sides to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations,” including reduction of trade and investment barriers and a formal assurance by the US ruling out threat or use of nuclear weapons against NK.

(Background point: Consider the circumstances under which NK adopted the AF before you accuse them of being quick to break “their” agreements. At the beginning of the year (1994), the US announced deployment of Patriot missles to Scout Korea (SK) and continuance of its nuclear war games there, called “Team Spirit”–both aimed at NK. In all, 48 launching ramps and 192 warheads were sent to SK. This would have effect of “softening up” NK for imposition of the AF. The nuclear “crisis” that more immediately precipitated the AF talks led Clinton to dispatch stealth warplanes to NK, knowing that war might result from this decision. He was turned back from this path by a sobering calculation by the Pentagon: General Luck, US Commander in SK, estimated that resumption of full-scale war on the peninsula would cost 80-100,00 deaths; $100 billion cost to US; $1,000 billion in damages to countries involved and their neighbors. None of these considerations were lost on NK–making it hard to say that they properly “Agreed” to the Framework in the first place, that it was in fact “their” treaty to break even if they went against what it demanded. (But again, as I’ll show, NK did what the AF asked of it–coerced or not.))

There are two basic phases to the (latest) breakdown of US-NK relations:

First, the US under Clinton violated the AF in two major areas:

(1) The US waited until 1999 to lift the economic blockade against NK. This was a full five years since the AF and the clauses demanding mutual ‘normalization’ of relations.

(2) The US delivered the promised fuel only intermittently, dropping deliveries especially during the harsh NK winters. Also, the US seriously slow-walked construction of the two promised reactors.  As David Kang of the Financial Times wrote in 2003, “the first of these [reactors] were due to come into operation this year but it was clear in 1998 that it could be at least three years behind schedule because of US reservations and hesitancy,” and the progress is described as “barely begun.” (The South Koreans locally administering the project specified its defunding by the US.)

The second phase amounts to a campaign of outright aggression—including nuclear aggression—waged by the Bush administration against NK. Consider:

(1) After his first election, Bush immediately cut off diplomatic relations with NK per the negotiations begun under Clinton.

(2) After a “policy review,” Bush racheted up demands upon NK beyond that called for by the Agreed Framework (e.g., NK could now have no ballistic missles and had to cut conventional forces–both exceeding the dictates of the AF.)

(3) In Jan., 2000, he famously placed NK on the “axis of evil,” ultimately invading one of the other members.

(4) The US suspended its already limited food aid to NK.

(5) In Mar., 2002, leaked portions of the Pentagon’s “Nuclear Posture Review” showed the US is prepared to use nuclear weapons against NK, in violation of the Agreed Framework (and the 1992 Nuclear-Free Declaration which it reaffirmed).

**Note that at this point there is no indication, nor even a US allegation, that NK is pursuing nuclear rearmament.**

(6) In Oct., 2002, the US alleged that NK admitted to pursuing uranium enrichment during talks. (NK, along with US observers at the talks in question, deny this.) The US claimed that this violates the Agreed Framework, though uranium enrichment is not covered by the AF.

(7) In “response” to this ficticious infraction, the US cut off fuel oil supplies altogether and coerced Japan and other Asian neighbors to do likewise, at the start of the chilly North Korean winter.

**Only at this point does NK begin to speak of the “nullification of the Agreed Framework.”**

(8) On Dec.29, 2002, the New York Times reported on the new US “tailored containment” plan designed to drain NK economically and isolate them politically, ultimately to facilitate regime change. This included a plan to intercept NK missile sales to other states–not for security, but to deny NK much-needed hard currency.

(9) On Dec. 23, 2003, Rumsfeld reassured the press corps that US military is “perfectly capable” of waging war against NK and Iraq at the same time. (Colin Powell affirmed this veiled threat elsewhere, if only a bit more ‘veiled-ly’.) Bush alluded to a possible “nuclear strike” against the reactors.

(10) Jan. 2003:  In response, NK announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, freeing it to resume work on two nuclear reactors. (This is not a case of NK’s “breaking” an agreement: Withdrawal is permitted by the rules of the treaty with one month’s notice.) On Jan. 10, NK’s UN ambassador Pak Gil Yon denied NK is producing nuclear weapons–only “civilian” energy such as the undelivered light-water reactors were intended–but is keeping the option open as a matter of sovereign right to defense.

(11) At this time, US Asst. Secretary of State James Kelly toured South Korea and China to petition for tightening of economic sanctions against NK, in accord with “tailored containment.”

(12) In Feb., 2003, Gen. Richard Meyers, US Joint Chief of Staff, told NBC that NK is a target for “nuclear preemptive strike” by the US. South Korean investigative reporter Lee Si-Woo provided documentary evidence verifying that the US military had nuclear weapons in South Korea at the Jinhae naval base and had been practicing nuclear submarine attacks against NK (in violation of the 1992 Nuclear-Free Declaration and the 1994 Agreed Framework).

So to sum up the “Bush phase”: Bush halted the promised light water reactor program due to an allegation, unverified, that NK was pursuing nuclear technology which it was permitted under the relevant treaties to pursue. In response to a stepped-up program of US aggression toward them, NK (at long last) broke the seals on old nuclear technology and [claimed to have] weaponized it. At that point there were no treaties, and frankly no common-sense argument, to stand in the way of this move.

* * * * *

In conclusion, there is an important “deeper” story to all this that goes beyond the point I am trying to make here. I wrote this primarily to show the kind of “partner” the US is to those nations to which, like NK, it bears an imperialist relationship–to show how its behavior must look to these other nations and how this might prompt us to interpret the responsive behavior of these third parties.

I noted above that the US has not negotiated in earnest with NK–a mild way of putting the point. This “false face” is illustrated perfectly by Bush’s post-reelection appointment of Victor Cha as Asia Director for the National Security Council–and therefore chief architect of policy toward NK. Cha wrote a book outlining a nuclear negotiations strategy the US should adopt toward the regime. (You can get it at Amazon.com.) In it, he argues that the US should expect not to actually resolve anything at these talks. Instead, while maintaining the sincere appearance of desiring resolution, US negotiators should deliberately sabotage any successful outcome–but in such a way that NK appears (but is not actually) at fault. The stated aim is to portray NK as completely unreasonable in the eyes of its neighbors–to isolate it diplomatically and provide rationale for a unilateral strategy to be pursued by the US.

Cha openly states that the aim is the “coercion” and “punishment” of NK under the pretense of diplomatic “multilateralism.” This explains, first, why Bush was so adamant about  maintaining six-party regional nuclear talks with NK rather than the bilateral meetings every other country gets. (Recall his stupid, tautological defense of this policy in the Kerry debates–that bilateral talks should be avoided because “they would dismantle the multilateral talks” already begun: This is like protesting that one cannot get married because that would “dismantle my bachelor status” already in place; the statement is technically true but elucidates precisely nothing about the actual relative merits of bachelorhood versus married life. I mean, any change one makes “dismantles” a previous state of being–the trick is to say why that is a bad idea.) Second, that the sneaky, “coerci[ve]” intent demonstrated by the Cha appointment has held firm throughout the timeline described above should be clear to anyone paying attention.

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Expelled redux: Darwinism leads to atheism?

May 3, 2009 · 1 Comment

[Following up on previous posts here and here.]

Perhaps the most specious claim in Ben Stein’s creationism polemic Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed is that Darwinism leads to atheism.

While certain atheists may claim inspiration from Darwinism, there is no reason to take their word for the accuracy of this connection.

In truth, evolution simply removes one argument for theism—the argument that speciation and variety in nature can only be explained by appeal to god. (Mono)theists got along without this argument for nearly the whole life of monotheism. Nor do all theists make use of it now. The moral philosopher Immanuel Kant, to whom contemporary Christians are arguably indebted for their ethics, denied the whole of such “natural theology.”

By analogy: The fact that ‘god didn’t cause speciation’ is like the fact that ‘my best friend didn’t cause the coffee stain in my carpet.’ My friend didn’t spill the coffee—nor did he murder Jimmy Hoffa, nor has he done the great majority of things which are done every day in the world. But this hardly means he doesn’t exist. When I offer an alternate explanation for the coffee stain—the cat did it, or I did it—it has no bearing on my belief in my friend’s existence; there can be spilled coffee with or without my friend. In this sense, there can be natural speciation with or without god.

My point is not just that replacing a ‘godly’ mechanism with a natural one leaves any other arguments for god untouched. It is that there really should be more arguments. If Darwin’s single omission invites atheism, the case for theism was pretty weak to begin with. Similarly, if my marriage is over simply because my wife forgets how to cook pasta, the argument for us staying together (i.e., her pasta skills) was poor anyhow.

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Octomom and welfare ideology

April 24, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Of course the Octomom coverage is overblown, but not just in the sense the media overblows things all the time. The interest in Suleman’s story has long ceased to share anything in common with the interest surrounding previous multiple births, say, those profiled in the TLC series John and Kate Plus 8. Most everything said about Suleman is sharply negative or accompanied by something negative.

I’ve tried to get a handle on what precisely this woman has done to garner such criticism. I am told she was wrong to take on more children than she could care for properly. Suleman elected to have eight embryos implanted while she already had six birth children. People seem especially upset that the six are “already on welfare.” However, if the issue is simply that these children will not be cared for, this is largely irrelevant. The six are cared for by way of welfare, and ostensibly so will the new eight—right? One can complain about the “taxpayer burden” or some such, but this is an entirely separate matter from the provision of the children.

Nadya Suleman: The poor man's Angelina Jolie

Nadya Suleman: Subject of much hype

(Of course, this only speaks to the financial side of “care.” There is also the fear that Suleman’s energies and “face time” will be stretched to the point of inevitable child neglect. But here the ideology of The Family is at work. Yes, money aside, one parent is hardly enough for fourteen kids. But neither are two parents enough for one child. That a child should have to bypass a rich world of human resources to fundamentally identify with at most two persons within it is simply pathological. Granted, the family unit is the richest reproductive structure available to most of us—one does what one can. But let us not measure Ms. Suleman against some alternative nuclear “ideal.”)

And what of that taxpayer burden? So we each have to pay $.000000000001 (or whatever) more a year for the Suleman family? Should anyone really give a shit? (A newsworthy shit?) It isn’t as though Suleman’s story is illustrative of some epidemic; her case is unique. Plus, in economic terms, simple population growth pays off for the general economy and the federal budget alike; in time, Suleman’s children will contribute more than enough to offset any meager welfare payments they consume now. Taxpayers will pay more up front for this, but there is no evidence they will pay out in any net sense over time. (Not that I would care much if they did.)

Digging deeper

Criticism of Suleman brings American welfare ideology into sharper relief.

It is clear her critics view the welfare burden as a kind of penalty: For her poor judgment, the taxpayers are “stuck with” a bill. But why is this bill seen as a penalty, rather than simple spending? By comparison, nobody views themselves as “penalized” for the “mistake” of eating out when the waiter brings the ticket.

More to the case, we don’t say that the “conventional” parent who does not take welfare is “penalized” with diaper, clothes, etc. bills for giving birth. We consider these expenditures like any other.

So what makes Suleman’s case (or, welfare) different? Some will argue that she, and not the taxpayers, made the choice to procreate, therefore the responsibility for care is hers. But this doesn’t work. Some parents have unplanned (“unchosen”) pregnancies; the critics I have in mind would oppose welfare even for them. And the fact that we don’t view the non-welfare parent above as “penalized” has nothing to do with whether she chose the pregnancy. (Maybe she did; maybe she didn’t.) So “choosing” isn’t really the issue here: “Not choosing” gets society off the hook, allegedly, but never birth parents.

Critics could respond that the “conventional” parents didn’t take adequate precautions against the possibility of pregnancy; in leaving themselves open to chance, they “chose” it, and the responsibility, indirectly. But again, this doesn’t work: If the parents didn’t take sufficient precautions, then neither did society. There is always more both could have done to have prevented unwanted pregnancy. Saying ‘it isn’t society’s job to do this’ just begs the question that “Who chose?” was supposed to answer in the first place.

That is: If the “choosing party” is always responsible for care; and if we accept the idea of indirect “choice” through prevention-failure—It follows that, at best, the parents and society have a joint responsibility for care.

* * *

The reigning welfare ideology says “be responsible for your own.” But there is no clear standard by which we can define a child as her parent’s “own” which does not also make her society’s “own” (to whatever degree). She is at once a member of both groups. On the face of it, there is no more warrant for viewing public assistance as “coercive” to taxpayers than to for viewing parents as coerced for being made to feed and transport their biological children. If another truth lies under that “face,” we’ll need a hell of a lot more argument from the “ideologists” to show it.

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Birth citizenship depresses immigrant wages!

April 15, 2009 · 1 Comment

Most anti-immigration arguments beg the question; rather than showing how immigration is a problem, their arguments assume this very conclusion from the start.

By analogy, I heard Rush Limbaugh on the radio arguing against “smart cars”—tiny, very fuel efficient vehicles. His point was that these fare poorly in wrecks with larger cars. The argument was supposed to show that smart cars are a problem; but all it really showed was that the discrepancy between smart cars and larger ones is a problem. Pointing to a discrepancy tell us nothing about how to resolve it; that is a separate issue entirely and must be argued for independently. Rush’s argument points as much to getting rid of large cars as getting rid of small ones. It is just as reasonable for smart car owners to cite the discrepancy in favor of making all cars smart.

The same logic is behind arguments to the tune of “immigrants depress our wages.” Yes, when you have “rational” wage discrepancies among groups—when the wages correspond to discrepancies in skill levels, for instance—there can be a drag on the wages of the more highly paid group. But again, pointing out the discrepancy doesn’t tell us in which direction to resolve it. For the discrepancy describes a mutually adverse relationship. Mexican immigrants could just as fairly argue that the ‘skilling’ of the higher paid workers has served to ghettoize them in the second, low-paid group. Indeed, this skilling accounts for the existence of a tiered wage system in the first place. There is nothing ‘in’ the discrepancy to tell us which is the right way out of it. To side against the immigrants because they are immigrants assumes the very thing the “depression” argument was supposed to prove.

No group of wage laborers in history has ever impugned, legislated or barricaded its way out of a bidding war. There is no reason to think American-born workers will be the first. Their best bet is to unite with Mexican, etc. immigrants and bid together against the wage-payers. That might raise the standard of immigrant living, but if we can stomach that…

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Followup on Darwinism and eugenics, Nazism

April 12, 2009 · Leave a Comment

Here I tried to show that Darwinism does not theoretically license any attempt to engineer humans to become more “fit,” e.g. eugenics, killing disabled people in the Holocaust, etc. I quoted where Darwin himself says the practice would violate morality.

I might have added: Darwin condemns it on practical grounds as well. In The Origin of Species, he writes:

“It is good thus to try in our imagination to give any form [i.e., adaptive feature] some advantage over another. Probably in no single instance should we know what to do, so as to succeed. It will convince us of our ignorance on the mutual relations of all organic beings; a conviction which is necessary, as it seems to be difficult to acquire.”

In other words, not only may we not “enhance” humanity through artificial (versus natural) selection, but it wouldn’t work if it we tried. We simply don’t know which adaptations will enhance fitness and which won’t. The situation is a bit game-theoretic: The complexity of an environment, which includes all of the other organisms, and all of the infinite ways it (and they) might change in the future, preclude a solid basis for “engineering.” This is precisely why the theory of evolution is not a predictive one. It locates a real causal mechanism for speciation, but it by no means follows that we can anticipate precisely how a species will change to come. Yet this is precisely what would be needed in order to “breed” humans for fitness. (We can sort of breed animals for fitness only to the extent they remain in a relatively artificially closed system of domesticity or captivity.)

Ben Stein, et.al.: Do we need any further evidence to prove that Darwinism does not contain the “seeds of horror”?

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